Connecting to 64 bits targetInjecting dllDll injectedAllocating code in target processWriting code in target processAllocating return value memory in target processInjecting code to target processWaiting for code to completeError when injecting code in target process. Error code: 3 (on windows)
Baixei o 3d analyse e configurei pra usar uma configuração parecida com a do jogo em 100%, mas na hora apareceu o famoso \"error while injecting...\", após pensar um pouco, resolvi executar o 3d analyse como administrador e, adivinhe...
prince of persia sand of time is not working tell me the 3d analyze configurationprocessor : core2duo 2.4ghzRam : 1 gbvideo memory : 128 mbmy graphic card is : intel(R) G33/G31 express chipset familythe error is : D3DDEVCAPS_HWTRANSFORMANDLIGHT it is not supported for my graphic card (if i run without 3d analyze)
just wanted to tell that prince of persia : the two throne works amazingly well on 82865g 96MB cardthere is no need of 3d analyze for that but POP warrior within can get choppy but the two throne works great!!!!!i hav dual core processor 2.8Ghz and 512 MB ram
please help me, how ican run nfs prostreet & splinter cell:double agent on my pc with 3d analyzeri have win xp sp2,intel dg31pr motherboard,128 mb video memory,2.4 ghz. core 2 duo processor,2gb ram,intel 945 chipset. pls. help me & give me the settings please
This technique is one of the most common techniques used to inject malware into another process. The malware writes the path to its malicious dynamic-link library (DLL) in the virtual address space of another process, and ensures the remote process loads it by creating a remote thread in the target process.
Instead of injecting code into a host program (e.g., DLL injection), malware can perform a technique known as process hollowing. Process hollowing occurs when a malware unmaps (hollows out) the legitimate code from memory of the target process, and overwrites the memory space of the target process (e.g., svchost.exe) with a malicious executable.
Hooking is a technique used to intercept function calls. Malware can leverage hooking functionality to have their malicious DLL loaded upon an event getting triggered in a specific thread. This is usually done by calling SetWindowsHookEx to install a hook routine into the hook chain. The SetWindowsHookEx function takes four arguments. The first argument is the type of event. The events reflect the range of hook types, and vary from pressing keys on the keyboard (WH_KEYBOARD) to inputs to the mouse (WH_MOUSE), CBT, etc. The second argument is a pointer to the function the malware wants to invoke upon the event execution.The third argument is a module that contains the function. Thus, it is very common to see calls to LoadLibrary and GetProcAddress before calling SetWindowsHookEx. The last argument to this function is the thread with which the hook procedure is to be associated. If this value is set to zero all threads perform the action when the event is triggered. However, malware usually targets one thread for less noise, thus it is also possible to see calls CreateToolhelp32Snapshot and Thread32Next before SetWindowsHookEx to find and target a single thread. Once the DLL is injected, the malware executes its malicious code on behalf of the process that its threadId was passed to SetWindowsHookEx function. In Figure 5, Locky Ransomware implements this technique.
Malware can insert the location of their malicious library under the Appinit_Dlls registry key to have another process load their library. Every library under this registry key is loaded into every process that loads User32.dll. User32.dll is a very common library used for storing graphical elements such as dialog boxes. Thus, when a malware modifies this subkey, the majority of processes will load the malicious library. Figure 6 demonstrates the trojan Ginwui relying on this approach for injection and persistence. It simply opens the Appinit_Dlls registry key by calling RegCreateKeyEx, and modifies its values by calling RegSetValueEx.
This approach is very similar to the AppInit_DLLs approach, except that DLLs under this registry key are loaded into every process that calls the Win32 API functions CreateProcess, CreateProcessAsUser, CreateProcessWithLogonW, CreateProcessWithTokenW, and WinExec.
AtomBombing is a technique that was first introduced by enSilo research, and then used in Dridex V4. As we discussed in detail in a previous post, the technique also relies on APC injection. However, it uses atom tables for writing into memory of another process.
In this post, I covered ten different techniques that malware uses to hide its activity in another process. In general, malware either directly injects its shellcode into another process or it forces another process to load its malicious library. In Table 1, I have classified the various techniques and provided samples to serve as a reference for observing each injection technique covered in this post. The figures included throughout the post will help the researcher recognize the various techniques when reversing malware.
At Endgame, we constantly research advanced stealth techniques and bring protections into our product. We layer capabilities which detect malicious DLLs that load on some persistence (like AppInit DLLs, COM Hijacks, and more), prevent many forms of code injection in real-time via our patented shellcode injection protection, and detect malicious injected payloads running in memory delivered through any of the above techniques through our patent-pending fileless attack detection techniques. This approach allows our platform to be more effective than any other product on the market in protecting against code injection, while also maximizing resiliency against bypass due to emerging code injection techniques.
If you are still facing the issue, analyze the ProcMon logs to identify the third-party DLLs loaded in the AcroCEF or RdrCEF processes, and then safelist the Acrobat or Acrobat Reader folder in the corresponding third-party software.
Pilger did not help the method gives an error 3D-Analyze Error while injecting dll into target process the GT 440 card on the program forum read that it was necessary to put dumplings in front of the skip pixel shader 1.1 1.14 and 2.0 did not help
You can use source generators as an additional step in your script compilation process. You can use source generators to add new code while you compile your existing code. Like analyzers, you can use existing source generators or create your own.
Pin allows a tool to insert arbitrary code (written in C or C++) in arbitrary places in the executable. The code is added dynamically while the executable is running. This also makes it possible to attach Pin to an already running process.
These two components are instrumentation and analysis code. Both components live in a single executable, a Pintool. Pintools can be thought of as plugins that can modify the code generation process inside Pin.
Since a Pintool works like a plugin, it must run in the same address space as Pin and the executable to be instrumented. Hence the Pintool has access to all of the executable's data. It also shares file descriptors and other process information with the executable.
Pintools do not need to add explicit locking to instrumentation routines because Pin calls these routines while holding an internal lock called the VM lock. However, Pin does execute analysis and replacement functions in parallel, so Pintools may need to add locking to these routines if they access global data.
Since Pin, the tool, and the application may each acquire and release locks, Pintool developers must take care to avoid deadlocks with either the application or Pin. Deadlocks generally occur when two threads acquire the same locks in a different order. For example, thread A acquires lock L1 and then acquires lock L2, while thread B acquires lock L2 and then acquires lock L1. This will lead to a deadlock if thread A holds lock L1 and waits for L2 while thread B holds lock L2 and waits for L1. To avoid such deadlocks, Pin imposes a hierarchy on the order in which locks must be acquired. Pin generally acquires its own internal locks before the tool acquires any lock (e.g. via PIN_GetLock()). Additionally, we assume that the application may acquire locks at the top of this hierarchy (i.e. before Pin acquires its internal locks). The following diagram illustrates the hierarchy:
With a small change, we can turn the instruction counting example into a Pintool that prints the address of every instruction that is executed. This tool is useful for understanding the control flow of a program for debugging, or in processor design when simulating an instruction cache.
Pin provides support for buffering data for processing. If all that your analysis callback does is to store its arguments into a buffer, then you should be able to use the buffering API instead, with some performance benefit. PIN_DefineTraceBuffer() defines the buffer that will be used. The buffer is allocated by each thread when it starts up, and deallocated when the thread exits. INS_InsertFillBuffer() writes the requested data directly to the given buffer. The callback delineated in the PIN_DefineTraceBuffer() call is used to process the buffer when the buffer is nearly full, and when the thread exits. Pin does not serialize the calls to this callback, so it is the tool writers responsibilty to make sure this function is thread safe. This example records the PC of all instructions that access memory, and the effective address accessed by the instruction. Note that IARG_REG_REFERENCE, IARG_REG_CONST_REFERENCE, IARG_CONTEXT, IARG_CONST_CONTEXT and IARG_PARTIAL_CONTEXT can NOT be used in the Fast Buffering APIs
Pin's advanced debugging extensions allow you to debug an application, even while it runs under Pin in JIT mode. Moreover, your Pintool can add support for new debugger commands, without making any changes to GDB, LLDB or Visual Studio. This allows you to interactively control your Pintool from within a live debugger session. Finally, Pintools can add powerful new debugger features that are enabled via instrumentation. For example, a Pintool can use instrumentation to look for an interesting condition (like a memory buffer overwrite) and then stop at a live debugger session when that condition occurs. 153554b96e