Anti-epidermal growth-factor receptor (EGFR) monoclonal antibody (MoAb) treatment for chemotherapy refractory or metastatic colorectal cancer has obtained great achievement. However, not every colorectal patient responds to such molecular-targeted agent well. Biomarkers associated with anti-EGFR resistance are not limited to KRAS mutation up to now. It was recently reported that cross-talking molecular effectors interacted with EGFR-related pathway were also negative predictor for anti-EGFR treatment. However, the limited data, controversial results, and contradictories between in vitro and clinical studies restrict the clinical application of these new biomarkers. Although the current theory of tumor microenvironment supported the application of multi-target treatment, the results from the clinical studies were less than expected. Moreover, WHO or RECIST guideline for response assessment in anti-EGFR MoAb treatment was also queried by recent AIO KRK-0306 trial. This review focuses on these controversies, contradictories, and limitations, in order to uncover the unmet needs in current status of anti-EGFR MoAb treatment in colorectal cancer.
The opposite [of the third claim] is clear from the first book of the Postpredicaments, the fourth book of the Metaphysics and the first book of De interpretatione, where [Aristotle] clearly means that it is impossible for two mutually contradictory contradictories to be true together or false together.10
For just as it is not impossible for two contradictories to be false at the same time in the case of insolubles, so it is not impossible for the same thing to be denied at the same time in the same case, and especially when the insolubles principally have reflection on their own signification.84
Technically, (RAA) involves a structural contraction, which is absent from (MTT) and Negation-Introduction. See, e.g., R. Routley, with V. Plumwood, R.K. Meyer, and R.T. Brady, Relevant Logics and Their Rivals, vol. I, ch. 3, §9 (Atascadero, CA, 1982), 278-283. Note also that in the present discussion it is implicit that each proposition is equivalent to its double-negation (that is, contradictories are mutually contradictory).
44. Rules on the Truth or Falsity of Opposed Propositions. -- (1) Contradictories are never either both true or both false, seeing that one is the negation pure and simple of the other. The truth of the one, then, carries with it the falsity of the other; and vice versa, the falsity of the one implies the truth of the other: If it is true that every man is just, it cannot be true that one man is not just. (2) Contrarics cannot both be true, but they can both be false.Contraries cannot both be true; otherwise contradictories would be true at the same time. Suppose the proposition, "Every man is just," to be true; the contradictory, "One man is not just," is false. If it is false to say that one man -- even a single individual -- is not just, much more is it false to say that every man is not just, or -- which comes to the same thing -- that no man is just. The proposition, "No man is just," is the contrary of the proposition, "Every man is just." But the falsity of a proposition does not imply the truth of the contrary. It may be false that all men are just without its being true that no man is just; there may be some just men, even though not all are just. (3) By a rule opposed to that of contraries, sub-contraries may both be true. E. g.: Some man is just; some man is not just. Justice may be an attribute of one portion of mankind and not of the other. But sub-contradictories cannot both be false, or both of two contradictories would be false. Let the proposition, "Some man is just," be false; the contradictory, "No man is just," is therefore true. Much more, then, is it true that some man is not just, which is the sub-contrary.
Clearly, (2a) and (2b) cannot both be true; LNC applies to futurecontingents as straightforwardly as to any other pair ofcontradictories. But what of LEM? Here is where the difficultiesbegin, culminating in the passage with which Aristotle concludes and(apparently) summarizes his account:
While Aristotle would see a republican France as rendering (7a) falseand (7b) automatically true, Frege (1892) and Strawson (1950) rejectthe notion that either of these sentences can be used to make a trueor false assertion. Instead, both statements presuppose the existenceof a referent for the singular term; if the presupposition fails, sodoes the possibility of classical truth assignment. Note, however,that such analyses present a challenge to LEM only if (7b) is taken asthe true contradictory of (7a), an assumption not universallyshared. Russell, for example, allows for one reading of (7b) on whichit is, like (7a), false in the absence of a referent or denotatum forthe subject term; on that reading, on which the description hasprimary occurrence, the two sentences are not contradictories. In thisway, Russell (1905: 485) seeks to guide the French monarch out of theapparent trap without recourse to wigs or truth value gaps:
Sense of "denying that something stated or approved is completely true" is from c. 1600. Meaning "fond of contradicting" is from 1891. Other adjectives, now obsolete, in the same sense were contradictorious (early 15c.), contradictious (c. 1600), contradictive (1620s). Related: Contradictorily. Used earlier as a noun (late 14c.) in plural contradictories, "a pair of propositions inconsistent with each other."
Notes and Discussions THE UNITY OF WISDOM AND TEMPERANCE The attempt of Socrates to establish the unity of the virtues has long been an object of philosophic suspicion. Particular attention has been directed to the argument at Protagoras 332a-333b, in which Socrates seeks to demonstrate the unity of wisdom and temperance, by showing that they must be identified as the contrary of folly. The argument proceeds on the assumption that wisdom and temperance are distinct, and so terminates in a contradiction between 'Whatever admits of a contrary admits of one only' and 'Folly, which is one thing, has two contraries, wisdom and temperance.' Scholars have generally rejected Socrates' proof of the second of the contradictory propositions. However, in a recent paper, Professor David Savan has claimed that the contradiction is derived in a formally valid way from premisses which either need no argument or are accepted by Protagoras} My intent in this paper is to cast doubt on this claim, and so to restore the status quo. According to the critics, the weak point in the argument is Socrates' defence of the statement 'Foolish acts and temperate acts are contraries.' But Saran holds that this statement follows from three conditionals, all stated by Socrates and accepted by Protagoras. These conditionals, referred to by Savan as F G and H, will here be termed P1-3. P1 If an act is right and advantageous, then it is temperate. Symbolically: (r.a) D t P2 If an act is wrong, then it is foolish. w~f P3 If an act is foolish, then it is not temperate. fD -t From these, Saran argues, "it follows that 'An act is right' and 'An act is temperate ' are truth functionallyequivalent, as are 'An act is wrong' and 'An act is foolish'. ... Since right and wrong are either contraries or contradictories, temperate and foolish acts must also be either contraries or contradictories" (p. 24). Savan then argues that Protagoras, on the basis of his remarks earlier in the dialogue, must take right and wrong to be contradictories, so that temperate and foolish actions are also contradictories, rather than contraries. I want first to consider whether the material equivalences alleged to follow from P1-3 do in fact follow. They may be symbolized: Clr~t C2w =f It is immediately clear that neither C1 nor C2 follows from P1-3. But this is not surprising, because some expression of the relation between 'right' and 'wrong' 1D. Saran, "Socrates'Logic and the Unity of Wisdom and Temperance," in R. J. Butler (ed.), AnalyticalPhilosophy,2nd series(Oxford: BasilBlackwell,1965),pp. 20-26.  158 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY must appear among the premises. Since Savan raises the question whether 'right' and 'wrong' are contraries or contradictories only after he claims to establish C1 and C2, we may suppose that the argument should hold whichever relation we assume. If 'right' and 'wrong' are contraries we add the premise: P4A r D --w And ifthey are contradictorieswe add the stronger premise: P4B r -- --w But neither C1 nor C2 follows from PI-3 together with either P4A or P4B. However, it may be urged, the argument fails only because 'advantageous' has been treated as an independent term. P1 should be replaced by: PI* r ~ t We now find that PI*-3 and P4B are sufficientto derive C1 and C2. But PI*-3 and P4A do not suffice.The most we can establish, using only P4A, is the disjunction : C1 vC2r -- t-v-w -- f And this is useless for the purposes of Socrates' argument. One further way of strengthening the premises might be suggested. Instead of dropping 'advantageous' from the argument, one might take it as related both to 'right' and to 'foolish.' That is, one might introduce additional premises from the pairs: P5A r ~ a P5B r - a and: P6A a D -f P6B a ---- -f P5A, added to P1-3 and P4B, will suffice for the derivation of C1 and C2. But no combination of premises not including P4B will do; from P1-3, P4A, P5B and P6B, one can derive C1 but not C2. It is, therefore, necessary to modify Savan's claim in two fairly important... 2b1af7f3a8